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SECTION ONE
ON THE PREJUDICES OF PHILOSOPHERS
I
The will to truth, which will seduce us yet to many a risky venture, 
that famous truthfulness about which all philosophers to date have 
spoken with deference: what manner of questions has this will to 
truth presented for us! What strange, wicked, questionable ques­
tions! It is already a long story, and yet doesn’t it seem to be just 
getting started? Is it any wonder that we finally grow suspicious, 
lose patience, turn round impatiently? That rve learn from this 
Sphinx how to pose questions of our own? Who is actually asking 
us the questions here? What is it in us that really wants to ‘get at 
the truth’?
It is true that we paused for a long time to question the origin 
of this will, until finally we came to a complete stop at an even 
more basic question. We asked about the value of this will. Given 
that we want truth: why do we not prefer untruth? And uncertainty? 
Even ignorance?
The problem of the value of truth appeared before us—or did 
we appear before it? Which of us here is Oedipus? Which the 
Sphinx? It is a rendezvous, so it seems, of questions and question 
marks.
And would you believe that in the end it seems to us as if the 
problem had never yet been posed, as if we were seeing it for 
the first time, focusing on it, daring it? For there is daring to it, 
and perhaps no daring greater.
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‘How could something arise from its opposite? Truth from error, 
for example? Or the will to truth from the will to deception? Or 
altruism from egoism? Or the wise man’s pure, radiant contem­
plation from covetous desire? Such origination is impossible;
6whoever dreams of it is a fool, or worse; those things of highest 
value must have a different origin, their own; they cannot be derived 
from this perishable, seductive, deceptive, lowly world, from this 
confusion of desire and delusion! Rather, their basis must lie in the 
womb of existence, in the imperishable, in the hidden god, in 
the “thing in itself”*—and nowhere else!’
Judgements of this kind constitute the typical prejudice by which 
we can always recognize the metaphysicians of every age; this kind 
of value judgement is at the back of all their logical proceedings; 
from out of this ‘belief’ of theirs, they go about seeking their 
‘knowledge’, which they end by ceremoniously dubbing ‘the truth’. 
The metaphysicians’ fundamental belief is the belief in the opposition 
of values. It has never occurred even to the most cautious among 
them to raise doubts here at the threshold, where doubts would be 
most necessary, even though they have vowed to themselves: ‘‘de 
omnibus dubitandum'.* For may there not be doubt, first of all, 
whether opposites even exist and, second, whether those popular 
value judgements and value oppositions upon which metaphysicians 
have placed their seal may be no more than foreground evaluations, 
temporary perspectives, viewed from out of a corner perhaps, or 
up from underneath, a perspective from below* (to borrow an 
expression common to painters)? However much value we may 
ascribe to truth, truthfulness, or altruism, it may be that we need 
to attribute a higher and more fundamental value to appearance, to 
the will to illusion, to egoism and desire. It could even be possible 
that the value of those good and honoured things consists precisely 
in the fact that in an insidious way they are related to those bad, 
seemingly opposite things, linked, knit together, even identical 
perhaps. Perhaps!
But who is willing to worry about such dangerous Perhapses? 
We must wait for a new category of philosophers to arrive, those 
whose taste and inclination are the reverse of their predecessors’— 
they will be in every sense philosophers of the dangerous Perhaps.
And to speak in all seriousness: I see these new philosophers 
coming.
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Having long kept a strict eye on the philosophers, and having 
looked between their lines, I say to myself: the largest part of 
conscious thinking has to be considered an instinctual activity, even 
in the case of philosophical thinking; we need a new understanding 
here, just as we’ve come to a new understanding of heredity and 
the ‘innate’. Just as the act of birth is scarcely relevant to the entire 
process and progress of heredity, so ‘consciousness’ is scarcely 
opposite to the instincts in any decisive sense—most of a philo­
sopher’s conscious thinking is secretly guided and channelled into 
particular tracks by his instincts. Behind all logic, too, and its 
apparent tyranny of movement there are value judgements, or to 
speak more clearly, physiological demands for the preservation of a 
particular kind of life. That a certainty is worth more than an 
uncertainty, for example, or that appearance is worth less than 
‘truth’: whatever their regulatory importance for us, such evalu­
ations might still be nothing but foreground evaluations, a certain 
kind of niaiserie,* as is required for the preservation of beings like 
us. Given, that is, that man is not necessarily the ‘measure of all 
things’*. . .
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We do not object to a judgement just because it is false; this is 
probably what is strangest about our new language. The question 
is rather to what extent the judgement furthers life, preserves life, 
preserves the species, perhaps even cultivates the species; and we 
are in principle inclined to claim that judgements that are the most 
false (among which are the synthetic a priori judgements)* are the 
most indispensable to us, that man could not live without accepting 
logical fictions, without measuring reality by the purely invented 
world of the unconditional, self-referential, without a continual 
falsification of the world by means of the number—that to give up 
false judgements would be to give up life, to deny life. Admitting 
untruth as a condition of life: that means to resist familiar values 
in a dangerous way; and a philosophy that dares this has already 
placed itself beyond good and evil.
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What provokes us to look at all philosophers with a mixture of 
distrust and contempt is not that we are always uncovering how 
guileless they are—how often and easily they lose their grasp or 
their way, in short how childish and childlike they are. It is rather 
that they are not honest enough, however loud and virtuous a 
racket they all make as soon as the problem of truthfulness is 
touched upon, even from afar. For they act as if they had discovered 
and acquired what are actually their opinions through the indepen­
dent unravelling of a cold, pure, divinely unhampered dialectic 
(whereas mystics of every order, who are more honest, and more 
foolish, speak of ‘inspiration’); basically, however, they are using 
reasons sought after the fact to defend a pre-existing tenet, a sudden 
idea, a ‘brainstorm’, or, in most cases, a rarefied and abstract version 
of their heart’s desire. They are all of them advocates who refuse 
the name, that is in most cases wily spokesmen for their prejudices, 
which they dub ‘truths’; and they are very far from having a 
conscience brave enough to own up to it, very far from having the 
good taste to announce it bravely, whether to warn a foe or a friend, 
or simply from high spirits and self-mockery. We have to smile at 
the spectacle of old Kant’s hypocrisy,* as rigid as it is chaste, as he 
lures us onto the dialectical backroads that lead (or better, mislead) 
us to his ‘categorical imperative’,* for we are fastidious and take 
no small amusement in monitoring the subtle wiles of old moralists 
and moral preachers. Or take that hocus-pocus of mathematical 
form in which Spinoza armoured and disguised his philosophy 
(‘the love of his wisdom’* ultimately, if we interpret the word 
correctly and fairly), to intimidate at the outset any brave assailant 
who might dare to throw a glance at this invincible virgin and 
Pallas Athena—how this sickly hermit’s masquerade betrays his 
own timidity and assailability!
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Little by little I came to understand what every great philosophy 
to date has been: the personal confession of its author, a kind of 
unintended and unwitting memoir; and similarly, that the moral 
(or immoral) aims in every philosophy constituted the actual seed 
from which the whole plant invariably grew. Whenever explaining
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how a philosopher’s most far-fetched metaphysical propositions 
have come about, in fact, one always does well (and wisely) to ask 
first: ‘What morality is it (is he) aiming at?’ Thus I do not believe 
that an ‘instinct for knowledge’ is the father of philosophy, but 
rather that here as elsewhere a different instinct has merely made 
use of knowledge (and kNOwledge!)* as its tool. For anyone who 
scrutinizes the basic human instincts to determine how influential 
they have been as inspiring spirits (or demons and goblins) will find 
that all the instincts have practised philosophy, and that each one 
of them would like only too well to represent itself as the ultimate 
aim of existence and as the legitimate master of all other instincts. 
For every instinct is tyrannical; and as such seeks to philosophize.
Admittedly, things may be different (‘better’, if you like) with 
scholars, the truly scientific people; they may really have something 
like an instinct for knowledge, some small independent clockwork 
which, when properly wound up, works away bravely without neces­
sarily involving all the scholar’s other instincts. That is why a 
scholar’s real ‘interests’ generally lie elsewhere entirely, in his family, 
say, or in the acquisition of wealth, or in politics; indeed it is almost 
a matter of indifference whether his little machine is located in this 
branch of science or that, or whether the ‘promising’ young worker 
turns out to be a good philologist or a mushroom expert or a 
chemist: what he eventually becomes does not distinguish him 
About the philosopher, conversely, there is absolutely nothing that 
is impersonal; and it is above all his morality which proves decidedly 
and decisively who he is—that is, in what hierarchy the innermost 
drives of his nature are arranged.
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How malicious philosophers can be! I know of nothing more ven­
omous than the joke that Epicurus* made at the expense of Plato 
and the Platonists: he called them ‘Dionysiokolakes’. Literally and 
primarily, this means ‘flatterers of Dionysus’, that is, the tyrant’s 
appendages and toadies; but it also suggests: ‘They are all actors, 
there is nothing genuine about them’ (for ‘Dionysiokolax’ was a 
popular term for an actor). And the latter meaning contains the 
real malice that Epicurus fired off at Plato: he was annoyed by 
the mannered grandiosity, the theatricality that Plato and his pupils
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deployed so well, and that Epicurus did not! Epicurus, the old 
schoolmaster of Samos, sat tucked away in his little garden in 
Athens and wrote three hundred books—out of fury and ambition 
against Plato—who knows?
It took one hundred years for Greece to realize who this garden- 
god Epicurus had been.
Did it realize?
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In every philosophy there is a point when the philosopher’s ‘convic­
tion’ makes its entrance; or, in the language of an old mystery play:
adventavit asinus 
pulcher et fortissimus.*
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You want to live ‘according to nature’? Oh you noble Stoics,* what 
deceit lies in these words! Imagine a creature constituted like nature, 
prodigal beyond measure, neutral beyond measure, with no purpose 
or conscience, with no compassion or fairness, fertile and desolate 
and uncertain all at once; imagine Indifference itself as a power: 
how could you live according to this indifference? To live—isn’t 
that precisely the desire to be other than this nature? Doesn’t life 
mean weighing, preferring, being unjust, having limits, wanting to 
be Different? And even if the real meaning of your imperative 
‘to live according to nature’ is ‘to live according to life’—how could 
you do otherwise} Why make a principle out of something that you 
already are and needs must be?
The truth is something else entirely: while you pretend to delight 
in reading the canon of your law from nature, you want the opposite, 
you curious play-actors and self-deceivers! In your pride you want 
to dictate your morality, your ideals to nature, incorporate them 
into nature, of all things; you demand that nature be ‘according to 
Stoics’; you would like to make all existence exist in accordance with 
your own image alone—for the great and unending glorification and 
universalization of Stoicism! With all your love of truth, you force 
yourselves to stare so long, so constantly, so hypnotically at nature 
that you see it falsely, that is, stoically, and you become incapable
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of seeing it otherwise. And then out of some unfathomable arro­
gance you conceive the lunatic hope that because you know how to 
tyrannize yourself (Stoicism is self-tyranny), nature too can be tyr­
annized: for isn’t the Stoic a part of nature?. . .
But this is an old, eternal story: what took place back then with 
the Stoics is still taking place today, whenever a philosophy begins 
to believe in itself It always creates the world according to its own 
image, it cannot do otherwise; philosophy is this tyrannical drive 
itself, the most spiritual form of the will to power, to ‘creation of 
the world’, to the causa prima*
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The zeal and subtlety (I would almost like to say ‘cunning’) with 
which everyone in Europe today is raising the question ‘of the real 
and the apparent world’ give us cause for thought and for list­
ening—and anyone who hears only a ‘will to truth’ in the 
background certainly does not have the sharpest ears. In a few rare, 
isolated cases a will to truth really may have played a part, an 
extravagant or adventurous mood, a metaphysician’s craving for the 
lost cause, a will that ultimately prefers a handful of ‘certainty’ to 
a whole wagonload of beautiful possibilities; there may even be 
some puritanical fanatics of conscience* who would rather lay down 
their lives for a certain Nothing than for an uncertain Something. 
But however valiant the gestures of such virtue, this is nihilism, 
the sign of a despairing, mortally weary soul. With stronger, more 
vital thinkers, still thirsty for life, things are different: they take 
sides against appearance and are already pronouncing the word 
‘perspectivist’ with arrogance; they take the credibility of their own 
body about as seriously as the credibility of the appearance that 
‘the earth stands still’. They seem to be ready cheerfully to let 
drop from their hands their surest possession (for what do we 
believe in more surely than our bodies?) and who knows whether 
at bottom they might not want to regain something that they once 
possessed even more surely, something from the old homestead of 
belief of earlier times, the ‘immortal soul’ perhaps, or ‘the old 
god’—ideas, in short, that led to a life that was better, more robust 
and serene, than the one our ‘modern ideas’ can lead to? In this 
question, there is mistrust of modern ideas, disbelief in everything
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constructed yesterday and today; there may be a slight element of 
disgust and contempt, from those no longer able to tolerate the 
highly eclectic conceptual bric-a-brac that today’s so-called posi­
tivism brings to the market place; those with more fastidious taste 
are revolted by the fairground motley and frippery of all these 
reality-philosophists, who have nothing new or genuine apart from 
their motley. We should credit the sceptical anti-realists and know- 
ledge-microscopists of today with at least this much, I think: we 
have seen nothing to refute their instinct to escape from modern 
reality—their retrograde backroads are no concern of ours! What 
is important about them is not that they want to go ‘back’, but that 
they want to go—away\ With a little more strength, more buoyancy, 
courage, artistry, they would want to go beyond—and not back!
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People today are trying, it seems to me, to divert attention from 
Kant’s real influence on German philosophy, trying especially to 
evade what he himself considered his great value. Kant was most 
proud of his table of categories; holding it in his hands he said, 
‘This is the most difficult thing that ever could be undertaken for 
the benefit of metaphysics.’
But let us understand what this ‘could be’ really implies! He was 
proud of having discovered in man a new faculty, the faculty to 
make synthetic a priori judgements. Granted that he was deceiving 
himself about his discovery: nevertheless, the development and 
rapid flowering of German philosophy stem from this pride 
and from the rivalry of his disciples to discover if at all possible 
something worthy of even more pride—and in any event ‘new 
faculties’!
But let’s think about it, it is high time. ‘How are syilthetic a 
priori judgements possible}' wondered Kant, and what did he 
answer? They are facilitated by a faculty:* unfortunately, however, 
he did not say this in four words, but so cumbersomely, so venerably, 
and with such an expense of German profundity and omateness 
that people misheard the comical niaiserie allemande* in such an 
answer. They were ecstatic about this new faculty, in fact, and the 
rejoicing reached its height when Kant discovered a moral faculty
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in man as well. (For at that time Germans were still moral, and 
not yet ‘real-political’.*)
There followed the honeymoon of German philosophy; all the 
young theologians of the Tubingen Stiff* headed right for the 
bushes—they were all looking for ‘faculties’. And what all didn’t 
they find, in that innocent, rich, still youthful era of the German 
spirit when the malicious elf Romanticism was still piping and 
singing, back when no one yet had learned to distinguish between 
‘finding’ and ‘inventing’!* They found above all a faculty for the 
‘extra-sensual’: Schelling christened it ‘intellectual intuition’,* thus 
meeting the dearest desires of his essentially pious-desirous 
Germans. One can do no greater injustice to this whole arrogant, 
enthusiastic movement (which was youth itself, however audaciously 
it may have cloaked itself in grey, senile concepts) than to take it 
seriously and treat it with anything like moral indignation. Enough, 
people grew older—the dream vanished. The time came for them 
to rub their foreheads: they are rubbing them still today. They had 
been dreaming, and the first among them had been old Kant. 
‘Facilitated by a faculty’—that’s what he had said, or at least that’s 
what he had meant. But what kind of an answer is that? What kind 
of explanation? Isn’t it rather simply repeating the question? How 
can opium make us sleep? It is ‘facilitated by a faculty’, the virtus 
dormitiva, answers that doctor in Moliere,
quia est in eo virtus dormitiva
cujus est natura sensus assoupire.*
But answers like these belong in comedy, and for the Kantian 
question ‘How are synthetic a priori judgements possible?’ it is 
high time to substitute another question: ‘Why is the belief in 
such judgements necessary}'—it is time to understand that for the 
purpose of preserving treatures of our kind, we must believe that 
such judgements are true; \Vhich means, of course, that they could 
still be false judgements. Or to put it more clearly, and crudely and 
completely: synthetic a priori judgements should not ‘be possible’ 
at all; we have no right to them, in our mouths they are only false 
judgements. Yet the belief in their truth happens to be necessary 
as one of the foreground beliefs and appearances that constitute 
the perspective-optics of life.
And, finally, remembering the enormous effect that ‘German
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philosophy’ exercised throughout Europe (one understands, I hope, 
why it deserves quotation marks?), let no one doubt that a certain 
virtus dormitiva had a part in it: amidst the noble men of leisure, 
the moralists, mystics, artists, the partial Christians, and political 
obscurantists of every nation, people were delighted that German 
philosophy offered an antidote to the still overpowering sensualism 
pouring into this century from the previous one, in short: ‘sensus 
assoupire’. . .
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As regards materialistic atomism,* hardly anything has ever been 
so well refuted; in all Europe there is probably no scholar so 
unschooled as to want to credit it with serious meaning, apart from 
a handy everyday usefulness (that is, as a stylistic abbreviation). 
This we owe primarily to the Pole Boscovich,* who along with the 
Pole Copernicus* achieved the greatest victory yet in opposing 
the appearance of things. For while Copernicus convinced us to 
believe contrary to all our senses that the earth does not stand still, 
Boscovich taught us to renounce the last thing that ‘still stood’ 
about the earth, the belief in ‘substance’, in ‘matter’, in the bit of 
earth, the particle, the atom: no one on earth has ever won a greater 
triumph over the senses.
However, we must go even further and declare war, a merciless 
war unto the death against the ‘atomistic need’ that continues to 
live a dangerous afterlife in places where no one suspects it (as 
does the more famous ‘metaphysical need’).* The first step must 
be to kill off that other and more ominous atomism that Christianity 
taught best and longest: the atomism of the soul. If you allow me, I 
would use this phrase to describe the belief that holds the soul to 
be something ineradicable, eternal, indivisible, a monad, an atom: 
science must cast out this belief! And confidentially, we do not need 
to get rid of ‘the soul’ itself nor do without one of our oldest, most 
venerable hypotheses, which the bungling naturalists tend to do, 
losing ‘the soul’ as soon as they’ve touched on it. But the way is 
clear for new and refined versions of the hypothesis about the soul; 
in future, concepts such as the ‘mortal soul’ and the ‘soul as the 
multiplicity of the subject’ and the ‘soul as the social construct of 
drives and emotions’ will claim their rightful place in science. By
putting an end to the superstitions that proliferated with nearly 
tropical abundance around the idea of the soul, the new psychologist 
has of course seemed to cast himself into a new desolation and a 
new distrust—it may be that the old psychologists had it easier, 
merrier—but he knows that he is thereby also condemned to 
inventing, and—who knows?—perhaps to finding.—
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Physiologists should think twice before deciding that an organic 
being’s primary instinct is the instinct for self-preservation. A living 
being wants above all else to release its strength; life itself is the 
will to power, and self-preservation is only one of its indirect and 
most frequent consequences.
Here as everywhere, in short, we must beware of superfiuous teleo­
logical principles! And this is what the instinct for self-preservation 
is (which we owe to the inconsistency of Spinoza).* Such are 
the dictates of our method, which in essence demands that we be 
frugal with our principles.
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It now may be dawning on five or six thinkers that even physics is 
only a way of interpreting or arranging the world (if I may say so: 
according to us!) and not a way of explaining the world. But in so 
far as it relies on our belief in the senses, physics is taken for more 
than that, and shall long continue to be taken for more, for an 
explanation. Our eyes and fingers speak for it, appearance and 
palpability speak for it: to an era with essentially plebeian tastes 
this is enchanting, persuasive, convincing, for it instinctively follows 
the canonized truth of ever-popular sensualism. What is clear, what 
‘clarifies’? First, whatever can be seen and touched—you have to 
take every problem at least that far. Conversely, the magic of the 
Platonic method consisted precisely in its resistance to sensuality, 
for this was an aristocratic method, practised by people who may 
have enjoyed senses even stronger and more clamorous than those 
of our contemporaries, but who sought a higher triumph by mas­
tering them, by tossing over this colourful confusion of the senses 
(the rabble of the senses, as Plato called it) the pale, cold, grey nets 
of concepts. There was a kind of enjoyment in Plato’s manner of
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overpowering and interpreting the world different from the one 
currently offered us by physicists, including those Darwinists and 
anti-teleologists among the physiological workers with their prin­
ciple of the ‘least possible energy’* and the greatest possible 
stupidity. ‘Where man has nothing more to see and grasp, he has 
nothing more to seek’—that imperative certainly differs from 
Plato’s, but it may be exactly right for a hardy, industrious future 
race of machinists and bridge-builders who have only dirty work 
to do.
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In order to practise physiology with a good conscience, you have to 
believe that the sense organs are not phenomena in the philosophical 
idealist sense, for then they could not be causes! This is sensualism 
as a regulative hypothesis at least, if not as an heuristic principle.
What’s that.? And other people are actually saying that the 
external world is created by our sense organs? But then our body, 
as part of this external world, would be the creation of our sense 
organs! But then our very sense organs would be—the creation of 
our sense organs! It seems to me that this is a complete reductio 
ad absurdum:* assuming that the concept causa sui* is something 
completely absurd. It follows that the outer world is not the creation 
of our sense organs—?
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There are still some harmless self-scrutinizers who think that there 
are ‘immediate certainties’, as for example, ‘I think’, or, in Schopen­
hauer’s superstition,* ‘I will’—as if perception could grasp its 
object purely and nakedly as the ‘thing in itself’ without any 
falsification on the part of the subject or of the object. But I shall 
repeat a hundred times over that the ‘immediate certainty’, like 
‘absolute knowledge’ and the ‘thing in itself’, contains a contradictio 
in adjecto:* it’s time people freed themselves from the seduction of 
words! Let the common people think that perception means 
knowing-to-the-end,* the philosopher must say to himself, ‘If I 
analyse the process expressed by the proposition “I think”, I get a 
series of audacious assertions that would be difficult if not impos­
sible to prove; for example, that I am the one who is thinking, that
I?
there has to be a something doing the thinking, that thinking is an 
activity and an effect on the part of a being who is thought of as 
a cause, that an “I” exists, and finally, that we by now understand 
clearly what is designated as thinking—that I know what thinking 
is. For if I had not already decided it for myself, how could I 
determine that what is going on is not “willing” or “feeling”.? In 
short, saying “I think” assumes that I am comparing my present 
state with other states that I experience in myself, thereby estab­
lishing what it is: because of this reference back to another 
“knowledge”, there is, for me at least, no immediate “certainty” 
here.’
Thus, instead of that ‘immediate certainty’ that the common 
people may believe in, the philosopher gets handed a series of 
metaphysical questions: these are actually the intellect’s questions 
of conscience, such as, ‘Where does my concept of thinking come 
from? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What gives me the 
right to talk about an “I”, and beyond that an “I as cause”, and 
beyond that yet an “I as the cause of thoughts”?’ Anyone who dares 
to answer such metaphysical questions promptly by referring to a 
kind of epistemological intuition (like someone who says, ‘I think, 
and know that this at least is true, real, and certain’) will be met 
with a smile and two question marks by the philosopher of today. 
‘My dear sir,’ the philosopher may suggest, ‘it is improbable that 
you are not in error, but then why must we insist on truth?’
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As regards the superstition of logicians, I never tire of underlining 
a quick little fact that these superstitious people are reluctant to 
admit: namely, that a thought comes when ‘it’ wants to, and not 
when ‘I’ want it to; so it is falsifying the facts to say that the subject 
‘I’ is the condition of the predicate ‘think’. There is thinking,* but 
to assert that ‘there’ is the same thing as that famous old ‘I’ is, to 
put it mildly, only an assumption, an hypothesis, and certainly not 
an ‘immediate certainty’. And in the end ‘there is thinking’ is also 
going too far: even this ‘there’ contains an interpretation of the 
process and is not part of the process itself People are concluding 
here according to grammatical habit: ‘Thinking is an activity; for 
each activity there is someone who acts; therefore—.’ Following
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approximately the same pattern, ancient atomism looked for that 
particle of matter, the atom, to complement the effective ‘energy’ 
that works from out of it; more rigorous minds finally learned to 
do without this ‘little bit of earth’ and perhaps some day logicians 
will even get used to doing without that little ‘there’ (into which 
the honest old ‘F has evaporated).
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Truly, a theory is charming not least because it is refutable: that is 
Just what attracts the better minds to it. It would seem that the 
theory of ‘free will’, which has been refuted a hundred times over, 
owes its endurance to this charm alone—someone is always coming 
along and feeling strong enough to refute it.
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Philosophers tend to speak about the will as if everyone in the 
world knew all about it; Schopenhauer even suggested that the will 
was the only thing we actually do know, know through and through, 
know without additions or subtractions. But I continue to think 
that even in this case Schopenhauer was only doing what philo­
sophers simply tend to do: appropriating and exaggerating a common 
prejudice. As I see it, the act of willing is above all something 
complicated, something that has unity only as a word—and this 
common prejudice of using only one word has overridden the 
philosophers’ caution (which was never all that great anyway). So 
let us be more cautious for once, let us be ‘unphilosophical’. Let 
us say that in every act of willing there is first of all a multiplicity 
of feelings, namely the feeling of the condition we are moving away 
from and the feeling of the condition we are moving towards-, the 
feeling of this ‘away’ and this ‘towards’; and then a concomitant 
feeling in the muscles that, without our actually moving ‘arms and 
legs’, comes into play out of a kind of habit, whenever we ‘will’. 
Second, just as we must recognize feeling, and indeed many kinds 
of feeling, as an ingredient of the will, so must we likewise recognize 
thinking: in every act of will there is a commanding thought, and 
we must not deceive ourselves that this thought can be separated 
off from ‘willing’, as if we would then have any will left over! 
Third, the will is not merely a complex of feelings and thoughts.
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it is above all an emotion, and in fact the emotion of command. 
What is called ‘freedom of the will’ is essentially the emotion of 
superiority felt towards the one who must obey: ‘I am free, “he” 
must obey.’ This consciousness lies in every will, as does also a 
tense alertness, a direct gaze concentrated on one thing alone, an 
unconditional assessment that ‘now we must have this and nothing 
else’, an inner certainty that obedience will follow, and everything 
else that goes along with the condition of giving commands. A 
person who wills: this person is commanding a Something in 
himself that obeys, or that he thinks is obeying.
But let us now consider the strangest thing about the will, about 
this multifarious thing that the common people call by one word 
alone. In any given case, we both command and obey, and when 
we obey we know the feelings of coercion, pressure, oppression, 
resistance, and agitation that begin immediately after the act of 
will. On the other hand, we are in the habit of ignoring or over­
looking this division by means of the synthetic concept ‘P. Thus, 
a whole series of erroneous conclusions and therefore of false 
assessments of the will itself has been appended to willing in such 
a way that the person who wills now believes with complete faith 
that willing is enough for action. Because in the vast majority of 
cases, willing has only occurred when there is also the expectation 
that the effect of the command—that is obedience, action—will 
follow, this impression has been translated into the feeling that there 
is a necessary effect; suffice it to say, the person willing thinks with 
some degree of certainty that will and action are somehow one: he 
attributes his success in carrying out his willing to the will itself 
and in this way enjoys an increase in that feeling of power that 
accompanies any kind of success. ‘Freedom of the will’—that is 
the word for that complex pleasurable condition experienced by the 
person willing who commands and simultaneously identifies himself 
with the one who executes the command—as such he can share in 
enjoying a triumph over resistance, while secretly judging that it 
was actually his will that overcame that resistance. Thus the person 
willing adds to his pleasurable feeling as commander the pleasurable 
feelings of the successful executing instrument, the serviceable 
‘underwiir or under-soul (our body after all is nothing but a social 
structure of many souls). L’ejfet c’est moi:* what is occurring here 
occurs in every well-structured happy community where the ruling
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class identifies with the successes of the community as a whole. As 
we have said, every act of willing is simply a matter of commanding 
and obeying, based on a social structure of many ‘souls’; for this 
reason a philosopher should claim the right to comprehend willing 
from within the sphere of ethics: ethics, that is, understood as the 
theory of hierarchical relationships among which the phenomenon 
‘life’ has its origins.
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That individual philosophical concepts are not something isolated, 
something unto themselves, but rather grow up in reference and 
relatedness to one another; that however suddenly and arbitrarily 
they seem to emerge in the history of thought, they are as much a 
part of one system as are the branches of fauna on one continent: 
this is revealed not least by the way the most disparate philosophers 
invariably fill out one particular basic schema of possible philo­
sophies. Under some unseen spell they always run around the same 
orbit: however independent they may feel, one from the other, with 
their will to criticism or to system, something in them is leading 
them, driving them all to follow one another in a certain order— 
an inborn taxonomy and affinity of concepts. In truth their thinking 
is much less an act of discovery than an act of recognizing anew, 
remembering anew, a return back home to a distant, ancient uni­
versal economy of the soul from out of which those concepts 
initially grew: philosophizing is thus a kind of atavism of the highest 
order. This easily explains the strange family resemblance of all 
Indian, Greek, and German philosophizing. Wherever linguistic 
affinity, above all, is present, everything necessary for an analogous 
development and sequence of philosophical systems will inevitably 
be on hand from the beginning, thanks to the shared philosophy 
of grammar (I mean thanks to being unconsciously ruled and 
guided by similar grammatical functions), just as the way to certain 
other possibilities for interpreting the world will seem to be blocked. 
Philosophers from the Ural-Altaic linguistic zone (where the 
concept of the subject is least developed) will most probably look 
differently ‘into the world’ and will be found on other paths than 
Indo-Germans or Muslims: and in the last analysis, the spell of
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certain grammatical functions is the spell of physiological value 
judgements arid conditions of race.
This by way of a rejection of Locke’s superficiality’’' concerning 
the origin of ideas.
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The causa sui* is the best internal contradiction ever devised, a 
kind of logical freak or outrage: but because of man’s excessive 
pride we have come to be deeply and terribly entangled with this 
particular nonsense. The yearning for ‘freedom of the will’ in the 
superlative metaphysical sense that unfortunately still prevails in 
the minds of the half-educated, the yearning to bear complete and 
final responsibility for one’s own actions and to relieve God, the 
world, one’s ancestors, coincidence, society from it—this is really 
nothing less than being that same causa sui and, with a daring 
greater than Munchhausen’s,”' dragging yourself by your hair out 
of the swamp of nothingness and into existence. Now, if someone 
can see through the cloddish simplicity of this famous concept ‘free 
will’ and eliminate it from his mind, I would then ask him to take 
his ‘enlightenment’ a step further and likewise eliminate from his 
head the opposite of the non-concept ‘free will’: I mean the ‘unfree 
will’ which amounts to a misuse of cause and effect. One should 
not make the mistake of concretizing ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ as do 
the natural scientists (and whoever else today naturalizes in their 
thinking . . .), in conformity with the prevalent mechanistic foolish­
ness that pushes and tugs at the cause until it ‘has an effect’; ‘cause’ 
and ‘effect’ should be used only as pure concepts, as conventional 
fictions for the purpose of description or communication, and 
not for explanation. In the ‘in itself’ there is nothing of ‘causal 
associations’, of ‘necessity’, of ‘psychological constraint’; the effect 
does not follow ‘upon the cause’, no ‘law’ governs it. We alone are 
the ones who have invented causes, succession, reciprocity, rela­
tivity, coercion, number, law, freedom, reason, purpose; and if we 
project, if we mix this world of signs into things as if it were an 
‘in itself’, we act once more as we have always done, that is, 
mythologically. The ‘unfree will’ is mythology: in real life it is only 
a matter of strong and weak wills.
Whenever a thinker sniffs out coercion, necessity, obligation.
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pressure, constraint in any ‘causal connection’ or ‘psychological 
necessity’, it is almost always a symptom of where his own inad­
equacy lies: to feel this particular way is revealing—the person is 
revealing himself And if I have observed correctly, the ‘constraint 
of the will’ is always conceived as a problem from two completely 
opposite standpoints, but always in a profoundly personal way: the 
one group will not hear of relinquishing their ‘responsibility’, their 
belief in themselves, their personal right to take their credit (the vain 
races are of this type); conversely, the other group wants to be 
responsible for nothing, guilty of nothing, and out of their inner 
self-contempt they yearn to cast off their own selves one way or 
another. When this latter group writes books nowadays, they tend 
to take up the cause of criminals; a sort of socialistic compassion 
is their nicest disguise. And indeed, it is surprising how much 
prettier the fatalism of the weak-willed can look when it presents 
itself as ‘la religion de la souffrance humaine’;* that is what it 
means by ‘good taste’.
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If you’ll forgive me, an old philologist who can’t give up the 
wickedness of pointing out examples of bad interpretative practice, 
the ‘lawfulness of nature’ that you physicists speak about so proudly, 
as if. . .—this only exists by grace of your interpretations, your 
bad ‘philology’; it is not a factual matter, not a ‘text’, but rather no 
more than a naive humanitarian concoction, a contortion of 
meaning that allows you to succeed in accommodating the demo­
cratic instincts of the modern soul! ‘Equality before the law is 
everywhere—nature is no different and no better than we are’— 
this amiable ulterior thought once again masks the plebeian’s enmity 
towards everything privileged and autocratic, as well as a new and 
more subtle atheism. ‘Ni dieu, ni maitre’*—that’s what you folks 
want, too. So, ‘long live the law of nature!’ Isn’t that right.? But as 
I say, this is interpretation, not text; and someone could come along 
with the opposite intention and interpretative skill who, looking at 
the very same nature and referring to the very same phenomena, 
would read out of it the ruthlessly tyrannical and unrelenting 
assertion of power claims. Such an interpreter would put to you 
the universality and unconditionality in all ‘will to power’ in such
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a way that virtually every word, even the word ‘tryanny’, would 
ultimately appear useless or at least only as a modifying, mitigating 
metaphor—as too human. Yet this philosopher, too, would end by 
making the same claims for his world as you others do for yours, 
namely that its course is ‘necessary’ and ‘predictable’, not because 
laws are at work in it, but rather because the laws are absolutely 
lacking, and in every moment every power draws its final conse­
quence. And given that he too is just interpreting—and you’ll be 
eager to raise that objection, won’t you?—then, all the better.
23
Until now, all psychology has been brought to a stop by moral 
prejudices and fears: it has not dared to plumb these depths. If we 
may take previous writing as a symptom of what has also been 
suppressed, then no one in his thoughts has even brushed these 
depths as I have, as a morphology and evolutionary theory of the 
will to power. The force of moral prejudices has reached far into 
the most spiritual world, a world apparently cold and without 
premiss—and it has obviously had a harmful, inhibiting, blinding, 
distorting effect. A real physio-psychology must struggle with the 
unconscious resistances in the heart of the researcher, the ‘heart’ 
is working against it; a conscience that is still strong and hearty 
will be distressed and annoyed even by a theory of the reciprocal 
conditionality of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ instincts, which seems to be a 
kind of subtle immorality—and even more by a theory of the 
derivation of all good drives from bad ones. But granted that a 
person takes the emotions of hatred, envy, greed, power hunger as 
conditions for living, crucial and fundamental to the universal 
economy of life and therefore in need of intensifying if life is to be 
intensified, he is also a person who suffers from such an orientation 
in judgement as if he were seasick. And yet even this hypothesis is 
by no means the strangest or most painful one in this enormous, 
virtually new realm of dangerous insights—and in truth there are 
a hundred good reasons for everyone to stay away from it if he— 
can\ On the other hand, once your ship has strayed onto this course: 
well then! All right! Grit your teeth bravely! Open your eyes! Keep 
your hand at the helm!—we are going to be travelling beyond 
morality, and by daring to travel there we may in the process stifle
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or crush whatever remnant of morality we have left—but what do 
we matter! Never yet has ?i deeper world of insight been opened to 
bold travellers and adventurers; and the psychologist who makes 
this kind of ‘sacrifice’ (it is not the sacrifizio dell’intelletto,* quite 
the contrary!) may demand at least that psychology be recognized 
once again as the queen of the sciences, which the other sciences 
exist to serve and anticipate. For psychology has once again become 
the way to basic issues.
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